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The Silence of the Library:





On the basis of the idea that situational norms are mentally represented as associations between
environments and normative behavior, it was proposed that an environment can automatically direct
normative behavior. More specifically, when situational norms are well-established (e.g., when entering
the library, one should be silent), an environment is capable of automatically activating mental repre-
sentations of normative behavior and the behavior itself. In these experiments, participants were exposed
to pictures of environments, and effects on accessibility of representations of normative behavior and on
actual behavior were assessed. Results indicated that representations of behavior and actual behavior
itself are activated automatically when (a) goals to visit the environment are active and (b) strong
associations between environment and normative behavior are established.
Because humans are social animals, human behavior is strongly
influenced by behavior of other humans. This influence is often
very direct. When we interact with others, these others provide
direct input for our own thinking and doing. However, direct
influence may not reflect the essence of the success of humans as
social animals. After all, animals that are decidedly less social,
such as cats, are directly influenced by behavior of other cats.
Instead, being a successful social animal is largely dependent on
more indirect forms of social influence. When we are standing
behind a bookshelf in a library, there is often no direct influence of
others. Still, our behavior is affected by others (albeit indirectly):
We keep the level of noise down as much as possible. In such
cases, our behavior is guided by social norms. It is controlled by
the activation of behavior that we believe other people expect from
us (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Such social norms are pervasive and
form an essential mechanism by which human social behavior is
directed (Birenbaum & Sagarin, 1976; Dewey, 1922; Pepitone,
1976; Sherif, 1936).
Most research on social norms has hitherto concentrated mainly
on why and how norms are learned and whether norms predict
behavior, whereas the question of how social norms become active
in directing everyday behavior has received only little theoretical
analysis and empirical attention. The present study attempts to
push this important issue forward by focusing on situational
norms. Situational norms represent generally accepted beliefs
about how to behave in particular situations and are learned by
associating normative behavior to these situations. Behaving si-
lently when visiting a library or church are examples of such
well-established norms. Thus, situational norms refer to knowl-
edge or mental representations of appropriate behavior that guide
behavior in a certain situation or environment.
The present research examines the processes underlying the role
of situational norms in guiding social behavior. More specifically,
stimulated by recent work on automaticity in social behavior
(Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Dijkster-
huis & Bargh, 2001), we will test whether, and under which
circumstances, environments are capable of activating (mental
representations of) normative behavior automatically. In other
words, is it possible that normative behavior is elicited by envi-
ronments, without a consciously expressed fiat or mandate?
SOCIAL INFLUENCE: THE DEVELOPMENT AND
ENACTMENT OF SITUATIONAL NORMS
How do we learn to behave in a socially expected way in a given
environment? Research on social influence suggests that there are
two ways by which we learn situational norms (Cialdini & Trost,
1998; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Kelley, 1952). First, people learn
how to behave in ways they believe other people approve of, and
avoid those behaviors they think others disapprove of. This nor-
mative social influence is based on the fundamental need to be
accepted by others. Such beliefs about what others think we should
or should not do are also known as subjective norms (Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975) or injunctive norms (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno,
1991).
Sometimes people consult the behavior of those around them to
find out what to do. That is, people can also learn situational norms
through informational social influence. They see others’ behavior
as a source of information to help them define social reality and
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maximize the effectiveness of their social behavior. These beliefs
about what the majority of people do in specified environments are
also referred to as descriptive norms (Cialdini et al., 1991). Apart
from influence through observing behavior of others, descriptive
norms can also be verbally communicated (Latané, 1996; Miller &
Prentice, 1996).
Several researchers have incorporated the concept of social
norms in behavior models to optimize the prediction and explana-
tion of human action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Schwartz &
Tessler, 1972; Triandis, 1980; Zuckerman & Reis, 1978). There is
an abundance of findings demonstrating that self-reported mea-
sures of social norms (and especially subjective norms) correlate
with, and independently predict, a variety of behaviors over and
above attitudes, especially when the behavior occurs in social
settings (for reviews, see Ajzen, 1991; Armitage & Conner, 2001;
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
Of importance, although the observed correlations between
measured constructs provide valuable information about proximal
determinants of behavior, the research designs and measurement
procedures commonly used in these studies (i.e., correlational data
obtained by self-reports in a questionnaire setting) do not allow
one to draw firm conclusions about the processes underlying these
relations. For instance, when confronted by questionnaires probing
the relevant constructs, people are fully aware of, and capable of
retrieving, the reasons that underlie their behavioral acts. This
deliberate or reflective mode of responding necessarily leads to an
emphasis on conscious processes as determining normative behav-
ior. Indeed, the influence of explicitly expressed social norms on
behavior is often found to be mediated by behavioral intentions,
thereby suggesting that normative behavior occurs intentionally
and consciously. But is this always the case?
ENVIRONMENT, NORM, AND BEHAVIOR
In a series of experiments relevant to this question, Cialdini,
Reno, and Kallgren (1990; see also Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren,
1993) studied under which environmental conditions students will
act on the situational norm of behaving orderly in public spaces.
They stuffed handbills into students’ mailboxes located in a mail-
room and observed what students would do with them. When the
floor was already covered with many handbills, students dropped
handbills on the floor themselves. Conversely, under conditions of
a spotless mailroom, students behaved more orderly and dropped
fewer handbills on the floor. Of interest, the condition under which
students littered least was a condition in which the mailroom was
spotless except for one very salient exception: An almost finished
piece of watermelon. Thus, people behaved in an orderly way
when the situation in the environment vividly reminded them of
the norm that everybody behaved orderly except for “the pig that
spoiled the place.” Once the norm is activated, virtually all stu-
dents behave in line with it by putting the handbills in their bag.
One could assume that people were aware of the norm to engage
in normative behavior in the “watermelon condition.” It represents
the violation of a norm and it is likely that such effects of norm
violation on behavior are mediated by conscious awareness of the
norm. However, the difference between the conditions in which
nobody littered (the spotless mailroom) and the one in which many
people littered is more ambiguous. Were people in these conditions
aware of the norm? Perhaps, perhaps not. In any event, we would
like to argue that awareness of a norm is not necessary for evoking
normative behavior.
AUTOMATICITY IN NORMATIVE BEHAVIOR
Instead, we would like to argue that situational norms can guide
social behavior automatically. As argued earlier, situational norms
are knowledge-based beliefs about how to behave in particular
situations that are shaped by social influence. Insights into human
development suggest that these norms evolve in a stepwise manner
(Craig, 1996; Hetherington & Baltes, 1988). First, in the course of
socialization, individuals learn and practice common ways of
conduct that are characteristic for the society. This way, people
develop mental representations of how to execute generally ac-
cepted or normative behaviors (e.g., being quiet by lowering one’s
voice or behaving orderly by cleaning up a table or room). These
hierarchically ordered behavior representations or “action con-
cepts” (according to the terminology suggested by Hommel, 1998)
form part of our behavioral repertoire, and can be readily accessed
to guide and adjust behavior when required (see also Jeannerod,
1997; Powers, 1973). Later, the social environment (e.g., parents,
grandparents, friends, teachers, and the media) recurrently com-
municates and enforces beliefs about which normative behaviors
should be exhibited in which situation. This way, situational norms
become socially shared and well-established (Cialdini & Trost,
1998). It is also, and at the same time, likely that normative
behaviors become mentally associated with the specific situation
to which they apply (Harvey & Enzle, 1981). Consequently, the
situation can activate mental representations of normative behav-
iors automatically. And once activated, these representations pro-
vide the knowledge necessary for guiding one’s own situationally
appropriate behavior. The idea that situational norms are behav-
ioral guides that we apply effortlessly and automatically in pro-
ducing behavior is noncontroversial (Barker & Wright, 1955;
Schank & Abelson, 1977).
Our reasoning about the activation of normative behavior bears
similarity to recent findings of behavioral effects on the perception
of social stimuli. This research shows that the presence of stereo-
typed groups (e.g., elderly) not only leads to activation of seman-
tically associated behavioral traits (e.g., slow), but also to subse-
quent behavior in line with these traits (Bargh, Chen & Burrows,
1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg,
1998; Macrae et al., 1998; for a review, see Dijksterhuis & Bargh,
2001). The theoretical basis for predicting these effects is the
overlap between perceptual and behavioral representations for the
same type of behavior. Behavioral traits (e.g., moving slow) thus
provide the knowledge and the mechanisms for producing the
behavior oneself. Accordingly, the mere activation or perception
of behavioral traits (either primed by stereotypical information or
members of a social group) is capable of tuning behavior one is
already engaging, and thus causes one to adjust ongoing behaviors
without a consciously expressed intent to do so. We believe that,
like traits about groups, our knowledge about situational norms can
affect our behavior along the same lines.
But do physical environments always activate normative behav-
ior? That is, do we keep the level of noise down automatically on
the mere activation of the symbolic representation of a library?
The behavioral effects discussed above occur because of direct
activation of behavioral traits. This direct activation is possible as
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people develop strong and chronic associations between social
targets and traits (Devine, 1989; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994;
Stangor & Lange, 1994). These associations streamline the social
perception process, and help us to understand other people’s be-
havior in order to respond with an appropriate action of one’s own
(Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). In other words, social stimuli
have direct behavioral implications.
In the case of physical (or built) environments, however, a
different picture may emerge. Contrary to social stimuli, physical
environments do not comprise behavioral implications per se, that
is, they do neither display nor call for normative behavior directly.
Therefore, there is no necessity to access behavior representations
on the mere perception of physical environments to select a proper
social response. For example, imagine a person passing (and
seeing) the library on his or her way to the cafeteria. Under such
circumstances, there would be little point in reducing the volume
of one’s voice because this normative behavior is not relevant to
the person’s current goal. Whether library primes (representations
of) normative behaviors is likely to depend on whether the envi-
ronment is of immediate behavioral relevance (Barker, 1968; Leff,
1978). That is, as situational norms refer to socially expected ways
of behaving when being in an environment, these norms are readily
accessed to direct ongoing actions when visiting the environment
(Bargh, 1990). Accordingly, normative behavior is more likely to
be materialized when being behaviorally involved in, or having a
goal to visit the environment. Central to our process-oriented
approach toward normative behavior, then, is the idea that well-
established situational norms are put into operation automatically
on the goal to visit environments.
THE PRESENT RESEARCH
We report three experiments that were designed to investigate
the processes underlying the role of situational norms in guiding
behavior. The following questions are addressed. First, is the mere
activation of a symbolic representation of an environment (e.g., a
picture of a library) sufficient to activate mental representations of
normative behavior or does it require the goal to visit the library
(Experiment 1)? Second, does automatic activation of these be-
havior representations elicit overt behavior (Experiment 2)? Third,
are these effects dependent on the associative strength between
environment and normative behavior (Experiment 3). In the first
two experiments we focused on the norm of behaving silently in
libraries, and in the third experiment we used the social norm of
behaving mannerly in exclusive restaurants.
Before presenting these experiments, we first present two pilot
studies demonstrating that the specific behaviors examined in our
experiments are indeed normative. To the extent that they are
normative, the behaviors should uniquely correlate with subjective
norms or descriptive norms toward the behaviors. Accordingly, we
conducted two survey studies in which several potential determi-
nants of the behavior under investigation were measured and
scrutinized for interrelations.
Pilot Studies 1 and 2
Method
Two different samples of undergraduates participated in a survey study.
They were first exposed to a picture of a library (n  66) or exclusive
restaurant (n  62), and then asked to respond to several questions related
to the environment displayed on the picture. In line with previous research
on the role of social norms in attitude–behavior models (e.g., Schaalma,
Kok, & Peters, 1993; Sheeran & Orbell, 1999, see also Fishbein & Ajzen,
1975), the following constructs were measured: Self-reported frequency of
past visits to libraries (or exclusive restaurants) was assessed by asking
participants to indicate how often they had visited the respective environ-
ment in the last 2 weeks. Participants responded on a 10-point scale,
varying from never (1) to very often (10). Attitude toward being silent in
libraries (or being well-mannered in exclusive restaurants) was measured
by one bipolar 10-point item ranging from very bad (1) to very good (10).
Subjective norm was operationalized as the extent to which one believes
important others think that one should perform the given behavior in the
respective environment. Descriptive norm was assessed by asking partic-
ipants to what extent they believe the majority of other people are silent in
libraries (or behave well-mannered in exclusive restaurants). Mere belief
was operationalized as the extent to which one believes that libraries (or
exclusive restaurants) are silent (or well-mannered) places. These three
items were accompanied by a 10-point scale, varying from not at all (1) to
absolutely (10). As a measure of behavior, participants indicated to what
extent they are silent when visiting libraries (or well-mannered when
visiting exclusive restaurants) on a 10-point scale, varying from never (1)
to always (10).
Results and Discussion
Table 1 presents means and intercorrelations of the measured
constructs for the act of behaving silently in libraries and behaving
well-mannered in exclusive restaurants separately. As the means
show, our respondents are regular visitors of the library but less
frequent visitors of an exclusive restaurant. In addition, attitudes,
beliefs, subjective norms, descriptive norms, and experiences are
quite in favor of displaying the two actions in the environments,
and considering the low variance, there is much consensus about
this. By and large, then, our students exhibit the behaviors when
visiting the environments. Of more importance, however, both the
subjective norm and descriptive norm correlated significantly with
the behavioral measures.
To test which constructs were most predictive of behavior, two
separate stepwise multiple regression analyses were performed, in
which behavior was predicted by the measured constructs. First,
for the act of being silent in libraries, the analyses showed that
the behavior was significantly predicted by subjective norms,
-subjective norm  0.373, t(60)  3.21, p  .01, whereas the
contribution of the other variables was nonsignificant, -past fre-
quency  0.165, t(60)  1.43, ns; -attitude  0.031, t(60) 
0.26, ns; -mere belief  0.065, t(60)  1.34, ns; -descriptive
norm  0.155, t(60)  0.50, ns. In other words, only subjec-
tive norms shared unique variance with the behavioral measure.
A similar pattern of results emerged for the act of behaving
well-mannered in exclusive restaurants: Behavior was signifi-
cantly predicted by subjective norms, -subjective norm  0.456,
t(56)  3.96, p  .001, whereas the contribution of the other
variables was nonsignificant, -past frequency  0.062, t(56) 
0.53, ns; -attitude  0.111, t(56)  0.86, ns; -mere belief 
0.033, t(56)  0.57, ns; -descriptive norm  0.096, t(56) 
0.27, ns.
In short, our regression analysis approach suggests that our
sample population (i.e., undergraduates) conceive of their act of
behaving silently in libraries and well-mannered in exclusive res-
taurants as being largely normative. That is, when asked to indicate
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whether one performs the two behaviors, participants tend to base
their responses on situational norms.
Experiment 1
In the first experiment, we tested the hypothesis pertaining to
our key assumption that situational norms can be conceived of as
mental associations between an environment and normative be-
havior, and hence, that the goal to go to a library automatically
enhances the accessibility of the normative behavior. Participants
were exposed to a picture of one of two environments (a library or
railway station). After being exposed to the picture, a lexical
decision task was assessed to tap the accessibility of action con-
cepts representing the norm of being silent. Following previous
work of this kind, it was assumed that the time taken to recognize
the behavioral concepts in this task would reflect relative accessi-
bility of representations of normative behavior (Aarts & Dijkster-
huis, 2000; Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1995; Neely, 1991).
Thus, response latencies on these concepts served as a measure for
the activation of the situational norm. If the accessibility of ap-
propriate behavior representations is conditional on the presence of
a behavioral goal, as we hypothesize, priming of library would
decrease the speed of responding to behavioral concepts referring
to the situational norm only when being instigated with the goal to
go to the library. However, if the mere exposure to library suffices
to affect the responses, priming of library should enhance the
accessibility, irrespective of goal activation.
Method
Participants and Design
Fifty undergraduates participated in the experiment, receiving 6 Dutch
Guilders (approximately $2.50) in return. They were randomly assigned to
either a goal-control prime, no-goal-library prime, or goal-library prime
condition.
Experimental Task and Procedure
On arrival at the laboratory, participants were told that they would take
part in research conducted by different research teams, and that they had to
perform tasks on a computer. The computer program provided the instruc-
tions. Participants worked in separate cubicles and were provided with two
consecutive tasks.
The first task was announced as the “Picture Task.” Participants learned
that they were going to be briefly exposed to a picture of a certain
environment for 30 s. As a cover story, all participants were told that they
had to examine the picture and to answer some questions about it later.
Furthermore, two thirds of the participants also learned they had to visit the
environment after the experiment. Some participants were exposed to a
picture of a library, showing the interior design of it (hence, this condition
is referred to as the goal-library prime condition). The other participants
were shown a picture of a railway station, showing an empty platform.
Because the latter group of participants was not primed with an environ-
ment typically associated with the norm of behaving silently, this condition
can be treated as a goal-control prime condition. Apart from the goal-
control prime and goal-library prime condition we added a no-goal con-
dition: One third of the participants were also exposed to the library
picture. However, instead of anticipating a visit to the environment, these
participants were merely asked to carefully scrutinize the picture. Because
these participants were not instigated with the goal to visit the library, this
condition is referred to as the no-goal-library prime condition. None of the
pictures displayed people in the environment. Furthermore, the names of
the respective environments were not mentioned.
Next, participants were confronted with the lexical decision task in
which they had to respond to 24 words. Twelve of the words were existing
words and 12 were nonsense words. For every word appearing on the
screen, they were asked to decide as fast and as accurately as possible
whether the word was a meaningful word or not. Participants pressed keys
on the computer’s keyboard marked yes or no. All words appeared at the
same location on the screen, preceded by a fixation point, for 500 ms.
Response latencies were measured in milliseconds from the onset of the
words to the time participants pressed a key. The time interval between
word trials was 2 s. The words were presented in random order, and were
preceded by 4 practice trials. Among the existing words, 4 target words
represented the normative behavior (i.e., being silent) of interest: silent,
Table 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of Past Frequency of Visits, Attitude,
Subjective Norm, Descriptive Norm, Mere Belief, and Behavior in Pilot Studies
Measure M SD 2 3 4 5 6
Behavior: Behaving silent in libraries (n  66)
1. Past frequency of visits 6.30 1.70 .027 .015 .103 .003 .202
2. Attitude 8.81 1.40 .157 .302* .053 .141
3. Mere belief 8.70 1.12 .434*** .431*** .214
4. Subjective norm 9.02 0.90 .291* .373**
5. Descriptive norm 8.06 1.30 .257*
6. Behavior 7.72 1.35
Behavior: Well-mannered in exclusive restaurants (n  62)
1. Past frequency of visits 2.63 0.96 .015 .012 .190 .032 .027
2. Attitude 8.26 1.04 .163 .459*** .384** .297*
3. Mere belief 7.95 1.53 .286* .300* .107
4. Subjective norm 8.68 1.04 .730*** .456***
5. Descriptive norm 8.08 1.51 .377**
6. Behavior 7.76 1.53
* p  .05. ** p  .01. *** p  .001.
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quiet, still, whisper. The other 8 existing words were neither relevant for
the concept of being silent nor related to the two environments (large,
small, middle, begin, weak, strong, proceed, little). The length of the words
was controlled for. That is, the mean length of the silence and control
words was equal (M  6.0 letters).1
After the task, participants were thoroughly debriefed. The debriefing
indicated that participants were unaware of the hypotheses under investi-
gation. Moreover, they did not perceive any connection between the
different tasks. Not surprisingly, some participants spontaneously asked
when they were supposed to visit the environment on the picture, revealing
that we succeeded in the instigation of actual behavioral goals. Of course,
we told all participants that these instructions were only given to test our
hypotheses.
Results and Discussion
The average response latency on the 4 silence words and 8
control words were subjected to a 3 (prime: goal-control vs.
no-goal-library vs. goal-library) between-participants  2 (type of
word: silence vs. control) within-participants analysis of variance
(ANOVA). Incorrect (“no”) responses across these words were
excluded from the analyses (3% out of all responses). The analysis
yielded a significant Prime  Type of Word interaction, F(2,
47)  3.52, p  .04. No other effects were reliable (Fs  1).
Simple effect analysis showed that response latencies differed
between prime conditions for silence words, F(2, 47)  4.38, p 
.02, but not for control words (F  1). Planned comparison further
revealed that participants’ responses to silence words were faster
in the goal-library condition than in the goal-control condition,
F(1, 47)  7.60, p  .01, and in the no-goal-library condition, F(1,
47)  5.18, p  .03. There was no significant difference between
the control and no-goal-library conditions (F  1). Means are
presented in Table 2.
The results of Experiment 1 support our predictions. The acti-
vation of a library enhanced the speed of responding to concepts
related to normative behavior displayed in that environment. How-
ever, these effects only emerged when participants had the goal to
visit that environment. The speed of responding to concepts related
to normative behavior was equivalent across the control and no-
goal-library conditions. These results indicate that the goal of
doing things in a library heightens the accessibility of the behavior
representation of the social norm of being silent.
Experiment 2
So far, the results of Experiment 1 showed that the instigation of
the goal to visit a certain physical environment facilitates access to
behavior representations that are associated with the situational
norm pertaining to the environment. In Experiment 2, our aim was
to investigate whether the priming effects indeed lead to changes
in overt behavior.2
To assess changes in behavior, we measured the sound pressure
level (i.e., intensity) of participants’ voices while speaking. On the
basis of the results of the previous experiment, we expected
priming of library to decrease the intensity of participants’ voice,
but this decrease will be most pronounced for participants that are
instigated with the goal to go to the library.
Experiment 2 served two further purposes. First, we included
mediator variables to rule out alternative accounts for the observed
behavioral priming effects. For instance, going to the library may
affect participants’ mood or modify their level of arousal. Effects
of priming on behavior (i.e., voice intensity) may be attributable to
variances in these variables. Hence, for the present purpose, two
potential variables seemed relevant to test for mediator effects:
mood and arousal.
Furthermore, earlier we argued that situational norms are so-
cially shared beliefs that are the result of socialization and asso-
ciative learning. Generally accepted behaviors that are character-
istic of a society are well-learned and subsequently linked to
specific situations. Although it is likely that the establishment of
situational norms (and mental associations between situations and
normative behavior) does not require much direct practice or
regular experience, it may be questioned whether this logic also
pertains to the automatic activation of the normative behavior
itself. That is, do situational norms automatically become active in
guiding behavior on the goal to visit an environment without
regular experiences with the environment and associated norma-
tive action? To explore this important question, we assessed par-
ticipants’ frequency of past behavior to test whether regular direct




Sixty-nine undergraduates participated in the experiment, receiving 6
Dutch Guilders in return. They were randomly assigned to one of the
conditions described in Experiment 1.
1 In the lexical decision task, Dutch words were used. Here, we report
the English translations of the original words.
2 Obviously, activation of a behavior representation is not yet the same
as actual behavioral change. Recent neurophysiological evidence however
demonstrates that activation of a behavior representation (e.g., a gesture)
leads to the same activation in the anterior cingulate cortex as actually
performing this same behavior (Decety, Jeannerod, Germain, & Pastene,
1991; Jeannerod, 1997; Paus, Petrides, Evans, & Meyer, 1993; see also
Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001). That is, performing an action and merely
activating the representation of this action results in activation of the same
so-called “motor programs.” These motor programs are ultimately respon-
sible for actual behavior. According to these findings, activation of a
behavior representation should—all else being equal—lead to correspond-
ing changes in overt behavior. Hence, on the basis of the findings of
Experiment 1 in which we obtained evidence for activated behavior rep-
resentations, we can expect actual behavioral changes to occur in Experi-
ment 2.
Table 2
Response Latencies (in Milliseconds) as a Function of Goal






Silence words 578 (39) 568 (79) 524 (35)
Control words 562 (49) 566 (76) 553 (66)
Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
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Experimental Task and Procedure
On arrival at the lab, participants were told that they would take part in
research conducted by different research teams, and that they had to
perform tasks on a computer. The computer program provided the instruc-
tions. Participants worked in cubicles and were tested individually. They
were provided with four consecutive tasks: a priming task, a word pro-
nunciation task, the Affect–Arousal Scale, and a measure of past direct
experiences with the library.
First, participants were exposed to the picture task used in Experiment 1.
Next, participants were confronted with the word pronunciation task as-
sessing the sound pressure level of their voice in dB(A). For this task they
were instructed to read aloud 10 words that were presented on the computer
screen. This information was allegedly helpful for the purpose of designing
new communication systems. No explanation or instructions were given
regarding the way participants should pronounce the words. Each word
remained on the screen for 2 s. The time interval between words was 3 s.
To reduce noise in the sound pressure level score, 10 short words were
chosen that only comprise “soft” phonemes (see Fletcher, 1953), that is,
they did not contain letters like t or s. Participants were provided with a
microphone attached to a headset. To keep the distance fixed, the micro-
phone was placed 10 cm away from the mouth of the participants. Data of
each spoken word was filed by the computer, and subsequently converted
into dB(A) using audio software (GIPOS; Gigi & Vogten, 1998). The
microphone-recording system was calibrated to a 70 dB audio source
(white noise) reference tone (see Baken, 1987, for a more elaborate
discussion on the measurement of voice intensity). The dependent variable
was the mean dB(A) across the 10 words, representing a measure of voice
intensity.
Immediately after the word pronunciation task, a modified version of the
Affect–Arousal Scale (Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989) was administered. The
questionnaire contained six items differentiating feelings of mood and
arousal on 10-point scales. The mood items were bad–good, sad–happy,
and displeased–pleased. The arousal items were calm–excited, tired–
energetic, and sedate–aroused.3 Participants responded to each item in
terms of how they felt at that moment.
Furthermore, as part of a larger questionnaire on activities in daily life,
participants were asked to indicate how often they had visited the library in
the past month. To attenuate possible influences of the previous tasks on
the frequency estimates of past direct experiences, participants were ex-
plicitly instructed to be as accurate as possible in their recall (Aarts &
Dijksterhuis, 1999). The frequency estimates served as a measure of past
behavior.
At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed. As usual,
debriefing revealed that participants were not aware of a possible effect of
the priming task on later performance.
Results and Discussion
Effects on Behavior: Voice Intensity Scores
Voice intensity has been found to differ between males and
females (e.g., Coleman, Mabis, & Hinson, 1977; Huber, Statho-
poulos, Curione, Ash, & Johnson, 1999). Hence, to control for
gender differences, the voice intensity scores [dB(A)] were sub-
jected to a 3 (prime: goal-control vs. no-goal-library vs. goal-
library)  2 (gender: male vs. female) between-participants
ANOVA. The main effect of gender was highly significant, F(1,
63)  25.96, p  .001. Males produced a louder voice
(M  85.21) than females (M  81.99). However, the analysis
further showed that the effect of prime was significant,
F(2,63)  3.46, p  .04. The Prime  Gender interaction was not
significant (F  1). Planned comparison revealed that participants’
voices in the goal-library condition (M  83.16) were reliably less
loud than participants’ voices in the goal-control condition
(M  84.48), F(1, 63)  4.98, p  .03, and in the no-goal-library
condition (M  84.62), F(1, 63)  5.83, p  .02. There was no
significant difference between the control and no-goal-library con-
ditions (F  1).
Controlling for Mood and Arousal Effects
With the assessment of the mood and arousal scales, we wanted
to rule out potential mediators. We first conducted a multivariate
analysis of variance using priming condition and gender as the
independent variable and the average of the three mood items
(  0.81) and the average of the three arousal items (  0.50)
as the dependent variable. Next, we performed 3 (prime: goal-
control vs. no-goal-library vs. goal-library)  2 (gender: male vs.
female) between-participants analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs),
with the mood and arousal measures as covariates.
ANOVAs revealed no significant main effect of priming on the
two dependent variables (Fs  1), indicating that mood and
arousal were not affected by the prime conditions. ANCOVAs
yielded the same pattern of significant results for gender, prime,
and the interaction effect after controlling for mood—F(1, 62) 
25.70, p  .001; F(2, 62)  3.72, p  .04; and F(2, 62)  1,
respectively—and after controlling for arousal—F(1, 62)  27.35,
p  .001; F(2, 62)  3.37, p  .05; and F(2, 62)  1, respectively.
Taken together, then, these analyses indicate that the observed
pattern of results is neither attributable to changes in mood nor to
variations in arousal.
The role of past behavior. The mean frequency of past visits to
the library was 3.17 (SD  2.28), and all participants had at least
visited the library once in the last month. To test whether the
library prime effects on vocal performance are conditional on the
number of direct experiences with the library and associated nor-
mative behavior, we subjected the behavioral measure (voice in-
tensity) to a moderated hierarchical multiple regression analysis
(Baron & Kenny, 1986), in which the behavior is predicted by
gender (coded as male  1, female  2), prime (coded as goal-
control prime  1, no-goal-library prime  2, goal-library
prime  3), past behavior, and the Prime  Past Behavior inter-
action term. To reduce multicollinearity bias, all variables were
standardized before the cross-product was computed (Dunlap &
Kemery, 1987). This analysis showed that the prediction of be-
havior by gender and prime was significant, -gender  0.518,
t(64)  4.93, p  .01; -prime  0.238, t(64)  2.27, p 
.03 (these effects are similar to the ones resulting from the original
ANOVAs). However, including the main effect of past behavior
and the interaction term did not significantly add to the prediction
of behavior, -past behavior  0.075, t(64)  0.72, ns; -inter-
action  0.056, t(64)  0.60, ns. The nonsignificant interac-
tion effect indicates that the library prime effects on vocal behavior
are unconditional on the number of direct experiences.
In sum, the results of Experiment 2 showed that the priming of
representations of behaviors by physical environments extends to
3 These items are from “Influence of Mood on Health-Relevant Cogni-
tions,” by P. Salovey and D. Birnbaum, 1989, Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 57, pp. 539–551. Copyright 1989 by the American
Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission of the author.
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overt behavior. Participants’ voice intensity decreased when they
were exposed to a picture of a library, indicating that they behaved
in line with the primed behavior of being silent. However, this
effect was qualified by the presence of the goal to go to the library:
The library only affected the intensity of the voice under condi-
tions of processing the environment in behavioral term. Control-
ling for differences in mood and arousal did not modify the pattern
of results. Furthermore, the priming effects did not interact with
frequency of past behavior, suggesting that normative behavior can
be automatically activated without regular direct experiences with
the situational norm.
Experiment 3
The reasons behind conducting Experiment 3 were three-fold.
First, we tried to replicate the priming effects on normative be-
havior in a different domain, namely behavior associated with the
situational norm of behaving well-mannered in exclusive restau-
rants. Second, we attempted to provide more direct support for the
mediating role of the mental representations producing the priming
effects. According to the present conceptualization of situational
norms, effects of environmental priming on overt behavior should
depend on the strength of the association between environment and
normative behavior. Assuming that differences in associative
strength exist, it follows that the stronger the association, the
stronger the automatic effects of an environment on behavior will
be (for a similar logic, see, e.g., Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, & van
Knippenberg, 2000; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995).
Third, in Experiment 2 we found no evidence for the idea that
frequency of direct experiences with the environment (and the
associated normative behavior) moderates the priming effects. It
should be noted, however, that our research sample consisted of
participants that had all direct experiences with the environment.
Thus, the sensitivity of the measure might have been insufficient to
detect reliable moderating effects of direct experiences. Therefore,
we again assessed the frequency of direct experiences with an
exclusive restaurant (which is probably not visited by all partici-
pants on a regular basis; see also the pilot studies) to explore
moderating role of practice in behavioral priming effects.
In Experiment 3, associative strength was first measured by
means of a response latency paradigm in which participants were
briefly exposed to a picture of an environment (e.g., an exclusive
restaurant) and subsequently indicated as fast as possible whether
a presented action concept (e.g., well-mannered) described the way
one should behave in that environment. The speed of responding
thus represents an indirect measure of the ease of activating the
normative behavior by the environment. Next, effects of environ-
mental prime on behavior were observed during eating. We antic-
ipated that priming of an exclusive restaurant leads to well-
mannered behavior. However, the size of this effect should be
dependent on the associative strength between environment and
socially expected behavior. People who strongly associate an ex-
clusive restaurant with behaving mannerly will show stronger
behavioral effects than those with relatively weak associations. In
the control condition, however, associative strength should have




Forty-two undergraduates participated in the experiment, receiving 12
Dutch Guilders (approximately $6) in return. They were randomly assigned
to either the goal-control prime or goal-restaurant prime condition.
Experimental Task and Procedure
The experiment was conducted in the lab and consisted of two parts.
First, the associative strength between environment and normative behav-
ior was measured. One month later the effects of environmental priming
were tested on behavior.
Associative strength. After participants entered the lab, they were told
that they would take part in several studies. Participants were seated in
cubicles containing a computer. First, we measured how strongly the action
concept of “behaving mannerly” was associated with an exclusive restau-
rant. This was done with an association task. Participants were told that
pictures would be briefly (400 ms) presented on the screen, designating a
variety of environments. Furthermore, they learned that after each picture,
an action concept would be presented on the screen, and that their task was
to indicate as fast as possible whether the given action describes the
appropriate way of behaving in the environment on the picture. Some
pictures were succeeded with action concepts that are socially not expected
to be displayed in the environment (e.g., park–litter), and some pictures
were followed by action concepts that are socially expected to be exhibited
in the environment (e.g., exclusive restaurant–well-mannered). It should be
noted that we did not ask participants to indicate what one can do, but how
one should behave in the respective environments, that is, the situational
norm. In total, 80 pictures (20 different environments) appeared on the
screen, and 4 comprised a picture of the same exclusive restaurant (iden-
tical to the one used in the experimental prime condition later on). The 4
words succeeding this picture were related to the norm of mannerly
behavior (well-mannered, decent, orderly, tidy).
An association trial consisted of the following sequence of events: (a)
presentation of a (12 cm  8 cm) gray rectangle for 500 ms, (b) presen-
tation of a picture (color photograph of the same size) for 400 ms, (c)
presentation of a gray rectangle for 100 ms, and (d) presentation of the
action concept in the middle of the rectangle. The action concept remained
on the screen until the participant responded. Everything appeared at the
same location on the screen. Responses were collected from the computer
keyboard—participants pressed a key marked yes or no. Response latencies
were measured in milliseconds from the onset of the action concepts to the
time participants pressed a button. The time interval between trials was 2 s.
The trials were presented in random order, and preceded by four practice
trials. The mean reaction time on the four “restaurant” trials is indicative
for the associative strength. All participants responded with yes to the four
trials, indicating that they shared the norm of behaving mannerly in the
environment (see also the earlier presented pilot study).
Environmental priming manipulations. After 1 month, all participants
were contacted again with the request to participate in several tests that
were designed by different research teams. We were able to recruit 42
persons who also participated in the first part. Thus, we could relate their
associative strength between the exclusive restaurant and behaving man-
nerly with the data obtained later. Participants worked in a cubicle on
computers and were tested individually. After participants were seated in
the cubicle, they were exposed to the picture task. All participants first
received the goal to visit the environment on the picture. Next, they were
exposed to either the prime control (railway station) condition or the
exclusive restaurant prime condition.
Assessing behavioral effects. Immediately after the picture task, par-
ticipants were confronted with the “execution of mundane actions task.”
Participants were told that a team of researchers was pilot-testing a set of
mundane tasks for upcoming research, which lasted for about 3 min.
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Hence, participants were requested to perform short tasks, and to answer
some questions afterwards. They were seated at a table that was cleaned
before each session. For one of the tasks, participants were required to eat
a round-shaped biscuit that usually gives crumbs when one bites into it. A
hidden video camera recorded participants while they ate. The video
allowed a clear view of participants’ hand movements at the table while
consuming the biscuit. The dependent measure we assessed was the extent
to which participants kept their table clean and tidy. Accordingly, two
raters blind to experimental conditions and hypotheses rated the videotapes
on frequency of cleaning the table during the consumption of the biscuit.
Concretely, they counted the number of times participants removed crumbs
from the table during the task. The correlation between the two raters was
.94, and by averaging their ratings for each participant, we obtained a
measure representing well-mannered behavior.
Furthermore, participants were asked to indicate how often they had
visited an exclusive restaurant in the last month. This frequency estimate
served as a measure of past behavior. Finally, participants were thoroughly
debriefed. The debriefing indicated that participants did not perceive any
connection between the tasks. Thus, as in the previous experiments they
were not aware of any influence of the priming task on their later perfor-
mance. However, 2 participants did not complete the biscuit task. Hence,
these participants were excluded from further analyses.
Results and Discussion
Effects on Behavior
The measure of mannerly behavior was subjected to a 2 (prime:
control vs. restaurant) between-participants ANOVA. In line with
our prediction, the effect of prime was significant, F(1, 38)  5.85,
p  .03. Participants removed the crumbs substantially more often
in the restaurant condition (M  1.79) than in the control condition
(M  0.60), thereby replicating the behavioral priming effect of
Experiment 2.
The Mediating Role of Environment–Behavior Associative
Strength
According to our hypothesis, the priming effects should be
dependent on associative strength: After activation of an exclusive
restaurant, people who strongly associate that restaurant with be-
having mannerly will show stronger behavior effects than those
who weakly associate that restaurant with behaving mannerly.
Thus, the prime is supposed to moderate the relation between
associative strength and actual performance. To test this effect, we
subjected the behavioral measure to a moderated hierarchical mul-
tiple regression analysis, in which the behavior is predicted by
prime (coded as goal-control prime  1, goal-restaurant prime 
2), associative strength, and the Prime  Associative Strength
interaction term. To reduce multicollinearity bias, all variables
were standardized before the cross-product was computed. This
analysis showed that the prediction of behavior by prime,
-prime  0.366, t(36)  2.67, p  .02, and associative strength,
-associative strength  0.417, t(36)  3.05, p  .01, was
significantly improved by including the interaction term, -inter-
action  0.372, t(36)  2.99, p  .01.
The nature of the interaction effect is revealed when computing
Pearson correlations between the associative strength measure and
behavior under restaurant priming condition and under control
condition. First, there was no relation between associative strength
and behavior in the control prime condition (r  .10, ns), which
of course is due to the fact that the behavioral norm of behaving
well-mannered was not activated. Of more importance, the pre-
dicted relation between the associative strength measure and nor-
mative behavior in the restaurant prime condition was highly
significant (r  .65, p  .01): As the speed of responding to
appropriate behavior increases (i.e., when accessibility is higher),
so does the frequency of displaying normative actions. In other
words, the effect of the goal to visit an exclusive restaurant on
behaving well-mannered is mediated by the ease of accessing
representations of normative behavior.
The Role of Past Behavior
The mean frequency of past visits to an exclusive restaurant
was 1.43 (SD  1.15). Ten participants (25%) had not visited an
exclusive restaurant in past month. As in Experiment 2, we again
sought to test whether the effects of restaurant activation on
behavioral effects are conditional on the frequency of past behav-
ior. Accordingly, the behavioral measure (behaving well-man-
nered) was subjected to a moderated hierarchical multiple regres-
sion analysis, in which the behavior is predicted by the prime
conditions (coded as control prime  1, restaurant prime  2),
past behavior measure, and the Prime  Past Behavior interaction
term. As in the previous analyses, all variables were standardized
before the cross-product was computed. The regression analysis
showed that the prediction of behavior by prime was significant,
-prime  0.361, t(36)  2.37, p  .03. However, the main effect
of past behavior and the interaction term did not share significant
variances with behavior, -past behavior  0.081, t(36) 
0.53, ns; -interaction  0.140, t(36)  0.92, ns. These
results indicate that the restaurant prime affected actual perfor-
mance regardless of the number of direct experiences with the
environment and associated normative behavior in the past.
General Discussion
The present research adopted a process-oriented approach to
investigate how situational norms guide social behavior. It was
posited that situational norms can be seen as associations between
environment and normative behavior in memory that are shaped by
social influence. Because of these associations, it is possible to
automatically elicit the (mental representations of) behavior by
activating the goal to visit the environment. Three experiments
provided support for these ideas.
In the first two experiments, we established that library only
enhanced the accessibility of mental representations of being silent
and made participants talk less loud when they had a goal to visit
the library. These findings indicate that mere exposure to library
does not guide normative behavior directly. The present results
thus differ from findings obtained in inquiries on behavioral prim-
ing effects of social stimuli. This research establishes that mere
perception of social targets suffices to activate representations of
behavior traits and corresponding behavior, demonstrating the
strong and direct behavioral implications of social stimuli (Dijk-
sterhuis & Bargh, 2001). Physical (or built) environments, how-
ever, seem to impinge on social behavior in a different way. In
appreciating a functional view on human behavior, we believe that
people do not access representations of the norm of being silent
automatically on the mere perception of a library. It takes an
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additional step to prime the normative behavior and, as the present
results show, this happens when having the goal to visit the
environment.
Another way to interpret the effects of goals is to posit that
instructions to visit the environment simply prime more nodes in
memory, and thus renders representations of normative behavior
more accessible. However, it should be noted that our data indicate
that mere perception of environments (i.e., when participants only
scrutinized the interior features within the same amount of time)
does not suffice to facilitate normative behavior directly (com-
pared with controls). This effect resembles recent findings on the
role of processing goals in trait activation on the perception of
social targets (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli,
1997). Macrae et al. (1997) did not find the typical trait activation
effect after mere exposure to a picture of a woman or when
participants processed the picture in socially meaningless terms (if
they had to indicate whether there was a dot on the picture). A
picture of a woman only activated these traits if participants had
the goal to process the picture in socially relevant terms (e.g., “Is
the object on the picture a living thing?”). In line with this
research, we believe that the goal to visit the library renders the
environment of immediate behavioral relevance, and as a result,
facilitates access to representations of normative behavior (cf.
Bargh, 1990). That is, the goal to visit an environment activates
(albeit implicitly) thoughts about how one should behave in a
socially accepted way, thus triggering the normative behavior
associated with the environment automatically. In fact, given our
experimental procedures, the conditional role of goals in normative
behavior activation effect can be classified as an instance of
unintended goal-dependent automaticity (Bargh, 1989)—unin-
tended in the sense that it occurs as a result of the intentional
instigation of another goal (e.g., visiting the library).
Furthermore, we obtained evidence for the idea that the envi-
ronmental priming effects on behavior are conditional on the
associative strength between the representations of the environ-
ment and normative behavior. In Experiment 3, participants indi-
cated as fast as possible whether specific action concepts (well-
mannered) represent the normative way of behaving in a certain
environment briefly presented on a picture (an exclusive restau-
rant). Results showed that the priming effects of an exclusive
restaurant on well-mannered behavior were more pronounced for
participants with strong associations than for those who possessed
weak associations. This pattern of data concurs with other research
showing that accessibility of concepts after priming depends on the
associative strength between the concept and prime (Higgins,
1996). These results thus provide crucial information, as they show
that the respective normative behavior was more accessible for
some than for others, and moreover, that the priming effects of
physical environment were mediated by these variances in mental
accessibility.
Situational Norms Versus Personal Habits
The present conceptualization on the role of situational norms in
directing behavior bears similarity with recent treatments about
habitual social behavior (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh &
Gollwitzer, 1994; Ouellette & Wood, 1998). In both cases, goals
automatically prime behavior according to an “if–then” rule. How-
ever, situational norms and habits differ in how these automatic
effects originate. Habits are conceived of as idiosyncratically
learned goal–mean links in memory that gain strength by extensive
direct practice. These links emanate from a selection process in
which an action is regularly selected and performed that is per-
ceived to be most effective in obtaining a goal (e.g., taking the
bicycle instead of a bus to go to the university). Thus, Aarts and
Dijksterhuis (2000) found that cycling was automatically activated
by the goal to travel to the university, but only for those persons
that regularly use the bicycle for this trip.
Situational norms are socially shared beliefs representing links
between specific situations and normative behaviors. These norms
are also known as customs or social conventions that are the
product of socialization and cultural construal (e.g., Camic, 1986;
Durkheim, 1893/1964), and do not require much direct practice to
become well-established (Sperber, 1990). Direct practice may be
essential to learn how to execute the behavioral part (e.g., lower
one’s voice to be quiet) of situational norms, but not to associate
normative behavior to a given situation. Such associations can
easily be established by indirect experiences (Lieberman, 2000).
Situational norms thus are able to automatically become active in
a situation without much direct experience with that situation (cf.
Cohen, 1997). Indeed, the present data show that past behavior did
not enhance the priming effects. Of course, socialization may
cause people to differ in how well situational norms establish
(Cialdini & Trost, 1998). For example, some people grow up in an
environment in which the importance of well-mannered behavior
in exclusive establishments is more stressed, and therefore develop
stronger links between that situation and behavior. Hence, differ-
ences in associative strength are likely to occur because of differ-
ences in culture and social background.
Situational Norms and Control Over
Social Behavior Revisited
The most important theoretical significance of the present re-
search lies in demonstrating that situational norms are able to
guide social behavior directly, an observation that diverges from
findings in correlational survey studies on attitude–behavior mod-
els. As the present studies show, however, not all situational norms
guide social behavior directly. Only situational norms that are
well-established, in the sense of strong associations between en-
vironment and normative behavior, are automatically put in oper-
ation on the goal to visit the environment. For those who weakly
(or not at all) associate the environment with normative behavior,
the behavior representation is not spontaneously facilitated, and
hence, does not become accessible in guiding overt behavior.
Presumably, these people have to be consciously reminded (or
prompted) to the situational norm to enact the normative behavior
(e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; see also Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991). For
example, it may have been the case that participants in the Cialdini
et al. studies (1991) did not have such strong links between public
spaces and behaving orderly after all, and thus the additional piece
of watermelon made them more aware of the normative behavior.
In other words, under conditions of weak situational norms, indi-
viduals are more prone to intentional control, as they have to rely
on conscious intents to assimilate their ongoing behavior to the
norm pertaining to the situation at hand. However, because this
general perspective to automatic and intentional control of norma-
tive behavior as a function of associative strength is not directly
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tested in the current experiments, it still awaits further empirical
scrutiny.
Situational norms are rules and standards that are understood by
members of a group or society, and that guide behavior without the
force of laws. Although some norms may be rather local and
transient, this “lawless” force makes the concept of norms of
particular interest to social psychology. Recently, Cialdini and
Trost (1998) stated that “There has been some debate about the
usefulness of norms as an explanatory concept, . . . and in fact, the
variety of conceptualizations may have contributed to the confu-
sion concerning the actual role of social norms in directing our
behavior” (p. 152). One may argue that the present analysis may
further confuse the matter by conceptualizing situational norms as
associations between environment and normative behavior. How-
ever, our findings that were predicted from this conceptualization
may be quite instructive. That is, the idea that normative behavior
is directly evoked by environments when (a) goals are active that
render environments behaviorally relevant, and (b) behavior rep-
resentations become accessible as a result of socially shaped
associations between environment and normative behavior sug-
gests that automatic normative behavior follows similar principles
that are postulated in contemporary social cognition research to
account for the emergence of other automatic social behavior. In so
doing, we feel that we have become closer to capture the mecha-
nism that tells us how, when, and where normative behavior may
be expected.
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